THE FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Belgrade, 24 April200 1. 
II. THE AGENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1 have the honour to submit to the Court the Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) , dated 23 April2001, as well as one volume of Annexes ' .
The Application is filed in accordance and within the time-limit set out in Article 61 of the Statute. In accordance with the respective Rules and practice of the Court, 1 submit a certified copy of the Application. 
A. SHORT SUMMARY OF T H E RELIEF SOUGHT A N D OF T H E GROUND

Applicant shall argue that there are three clear and conclusive reasons which lead to the conclusion that this honoured Court has no jurisdiction over the FRY in the present case : (a) The FRY was not a Member o f the United Nations on 20 March 1993 when the Application o f the Republic o f Bosnia and Herzegovina was filed, or at any later moment until the Judgment o f 11 July 1996 was rendered (nor was it a Member thereafter, until 1 November 2000) ; ( b ) The FRY was not a State party to the Statute o f this Court on 20 March 1993, or at any later date until the Judgment o f 1 1 July 1996 was rendered (nor was it a Member thereafter, until 1 November 2000
) ceased to exist. Former republics of the SFRY took different courses of action endeavouring to acquire or confirm statehood. The former Government of the FRY insisted on continuity and asserted that it continued the statehood and personality of the SFRY. Before 27 October 2000, the FRY did not seek admission to the United Nations, and did not give notifications of accession to treaties, neither did it give notifications of succession to the treaties ratified by the SFRY (as other successor States did). The FRY asserted instead that it was a Member of the United Nations automaticallv (continuing the membership of the SFRY), and suggested that it also continued treatv membershi~ of the SFRY automaticallv. The former Government of* the FRY stiessed repeatedly that the FRY (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) continued the statehood of the SFRY from which other republics had seceded.
5. This was first stated in a Declaration' sent to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This Declaration was adopted on 27 April 1992 at a joint session of the Assembly of the SFRY *, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, and the Assembly of Montenegro. In the text it was indicated that this was a Declaration of "the representatives of the people of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro" -at the end of the text, "the participants of the joint session" were identified as signatories. The opening sentence of this Declaration stresses that the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro expressed their common will "to stay in the common state of Yugoslavia". The underlying political idea which conditioned the opinions expressed in the Declaration was clearly the perception that Yugoslavia continued to exist, that the FRY was the same State as the SFRY, and continued the identity of the SFRY.
The purpose of the Declaration was to state the views of the participants on policy objectives. As stressed in the introductory part of the Declaration :
"Remaining strictly comrnitted to the peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, wish to state in this Declaration their views on the basic, immediate and lasting objectives of the policy of their common state, and its relations with the former Yugoslav Republics."
The first "view"stated was the one which was cited and relied upon by the Court in its Judgment of 11 July 1996 : "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by al1 the commitments that the SFR of Yugoslavia assumed internationally."
' See the text of the Declaration in Annex 1 . * A t that time, it was contested whether the SFRY and its National Assembly still existed.
The Declaration was brought to the attention of the United Nations by a Note. At the same time, these former republics -and specifically Bosnia-Herzegovina -contested the assertion that the FRY continued the membership of the SFRY in the United Nations and in other international organizations, and contested that the FRY sustained the international standing, rights and obligations of the SFRY on the assumption of continuity.
To cite an example, when the standing of the FRY became an issue in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the debate which preceded General Assembly resolution 4711 (1992), Mr. Sakirbej, the Representative of BosniaHerzegovina stressed :
"[tlhe former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist. Serbia and Montenegro are not legally entitled to succeed to the position of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is a plicable to this body as well as to other similar international organizations." P The FRY'S claim to continuity was consistently denied by other successor States of the former SFRY. To cite just one more example, on 28 October 1996, the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia wrote a letter to the Secretary-General, in which they once again challenged the concept of continuity and automatic succession of the FRY, and contested that the FRY could become a Member of the United Nations otherwise but by seeking admission as other successor States did. After referring to Security Council resolution 77711992 of 19 September 1992, the Permanent Representatives asserted that :
Note dated 27 April 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. A1461915 (Annex 2).
Security (Annex 3).
UN doc.
Council resolution 755 (1992) Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly."
This resolution represents again a strong argument against continuity. At the same time, however, not consistent with the logic of the basic position taken (the FRY will only become a Member after it applies and gets admitted), the consequence which is spelled out ("shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly") is limited ; it is much more narrow than what would follow from the elementary fact that the FRY is simply not yet a Member of the United Nations. Some further uncertainty is created by taking note of the intention of the Security Council to reconsider the matter. What added to the confusion (and offered added support to the position taken by the FRY) was the fact that the list of conventions deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which there was a reference to "Yugoslavia" as a party included not only conventions regarding which treaty action was taken by the SFRY, but also conventions regarding which treaty action was taken after April 1992 by the FRY 12.
The complex and unresolved nature of the whole matter prompted initiatives to seek an advisory opinion from the Court, but no such request was ever submitted 13.
Membership Dues Paid to the United Nations
9. Another indication supporting the FRY'S claim to continued membership (and creating dilemmas) could be found in the circumstance that membership dues were requested by the United Nations, and paid to the United Nations by the FRY On 22 December 1997, for example, the General Assembly adopted resolution 521215 on "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations". This resolution starts with the following introduction : Furthermore, specific requests were sent to the representatives of the FRY for payment of membership dues 15, such dues were indeed paid by the FRY, l 2 See Annex 11 -"List of Conventions deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to which Yugoslavia is a signatory or participant", at pp. 1-4, shows those treaty actions which were identified by the Secretary-General as treaty actions of "Yugoslavia", and which were undertaken after the SFRY was dissolved and after the FRY was formed.
l 3 For example, during the meeting of the General Assembly of 22 September 1992, Mr. Nyakyi suggested on behalf of the United Republic of Tanzania to refer the matter of the standing of the FRY to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. See UN doc. Al47lPV.7, at p. 177 (Annex 12).
I4See General Assembly resolution 521215 -the text of this resolution is presented as Annex 13.
l5 See letters of the United Nations Secretary-General requesting membership dues in 1994 , 1995 , 1996 , 1997 , and 1998 . and receipt vouchers were issued confirming payment made by the Government of the FRY 16.
The Issue of Continuity and the Membership of the FRY in Treaties
10. Controversies and dilemmas were extended to treaty membership of the FRY as well after April 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina (together with Croatia and Slovenia) continuously argued that the FRY could not be regarded as a party to treaties because the FRY could not automatically continue the legal personality of the FRY, and because the FRY had not formally succeeded to the treaties. This logic extends to al1 treaties to which the SFRY was a party, and to which the FRY did not succeed or accede by a proper notification. The argument was raised in particular in connection with human rights treaties.
11. To give an illustration of the argument, in its Aide Mémoire of 14 January 1994, the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations stressed :
"Since the so-called 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' (Serbia and Montenegro) has not notified the Secretary-General of its succession to the International Convention on the Elimination of Al1 Forms of Racial Discrimination as one of the successor States of the former SFRY, it cannot be considered as one of the parties to the said convention. Therefore, as a non-party, the said delegation has no right to participate at the fifteenth meeting of the State Parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of Al1 Forms of Racial Discrimination." "[tlhe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continued to assert the automatic continuity of the legal personality of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a State that had ceased to exist. This assertion had been disputed by the other successor States and by other members of the international community. Under the circumstances, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was attempting to take advantage of the international treaties and concerns of the international community for human rights to buttress its assertion of automatic continuity of the Mr. MateSiC, the representative of Croatia added that :
"If the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) wished to be considered a party to the Covenant, it must notify the SecretaryGeneral, in his capacity as depositary of international treaties, of its succession as one of the successor States of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Currently it was not a party thereto, and thus had no right to participate in the Meeting." 20 After these arguments, Bosnia-Herzegovina's proposa1 to exclude the FRY from the Meeting was adopted by 51 votes for, 1 against and 20 abstentions 21.
13. This sequence of arguments and events was repeated on a number of occasions. During the 19th Meeting of the States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mr. MiSiC, the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposed that "the States Parties should decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should not articipate in the work of the meeting of the States Parties to the C~v e n a n t "~. The FRY vigorously contested the jurisdiction of the Court, but did so on other grounds, without raising the issue of the FRY'S membership and standing.
15. This Court had faced and recognized these issues in its Order of 8 April 1993 dealing with provisional measures. Since with respect to provisional measures there was no need to take a conclusive position, the Court introduced its considerations on jurisdiction by stating in paragraph 14 :
"Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, . . ."
The dilemmas regarding jurisdiction ratione personae were investigated in paragraph 15 of the Order. It was observed that the Application stated that both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY were members of the United Nations and of the Statute, but added at the same time that continuity of the FRY with the SFRY (the assumption on which the FRY based its claim for membership) "has been vigorously contested by the entire international community ".
In the following paragraphs the Court scrutinized various acts of the United Nations in order to clarify the question of (continued or other) membership of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and to the Statute. The persisting dilemma was convincingly mirrored in the letter of the Under-SecretaryGeneral and Legal Counsel of the United Nations of 29 September 1992 addressed to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of BosniaHerzegovina and Croatia. Relevant parts of this letter cited in the Order read as follows :
"While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations, the only practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can no longer participate in the work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferences and meetings convened by it.
On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and nameplate remain as before, but in Assembly bodies representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot sit behind the sign 'Yugoslavia'. Yugoslav missions at the United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to function and may receive and circulate documents. At Headquarters, the Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia as it is the last flag of Yugoslavia used by the Secretariat. The resolution does not take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly bodies. The admission to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter will terminate the situation created by resolution 4711." 27 Considering the complex and rather controversial indications, the Court found it more appropriate not to adopt a conclusive position regarding the FRY'S continued membership in the United Nations and standing as a party to the Statute, and formulated the following conclusion in paragraph 18 of the Order (following the citation from the letter of the Under-SecretaryGeneral) :
"Whereas, while the solution adopted is not free from legal difficulties, the question whether or not Yugoslavia is a Member of the United Nations and as such a party to the Statute of the Court is one which the Court does not need to determine definitively at the present stage of proceedings." (In the following section, considering the option described in Article 35 of the Statute -and staying within the ambit of prima facie considerationsthe Court investigated another possible basis for jurisdiction, and noted that "whereas accordingly if Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are both parties to the Genocide Convention, disputes to which Article IX applies are in any event prima facie within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court") 29.
The Applicant believes that it is fair to Say that given the quite unprecedented complexities and controversies regarding the issue of the membership of the FRY in international organizations and to international treaties, the Court was not in a position to conclude in its Order whether the membership (or the lack of membership) of the FRY in the United Nations and in relevant treaties, was an established fact. 16. In the Judgment of 11 July 1996, dealing with the issue of jurisdiction over the FRY ratione personae -and facing a situation which was still not clarified -the Court relied on the Declaration of the FRY Government in which the assumption of continuity was asserted. In paragraph 17 of the Judgment, the Court first established that the Genocide Convention was signed and ratified by the SFRY, and then established a link, adding that the FRY adopted a forma1 declaration on 27 April 1992 to the effect that: "This intention thus expressed by Yugoslavia to remain bound by the international treaties to which the former Yugoslavia was a party was confirmed in an official Note of 27 April 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General."
To this, a supporting observation was added : "The Court observes, furthermore, that it has not been contested that Yugoslavia was a party to the Genocide Convention." This observation was not developed further, and it was not posited as a possible independent basis of jurisdiction.
It may be true that the concept of continuity was never explicitly articulated by the Court itself, but it is also true that the Court relied exactly on declarations stressing the assumption of continuity in determining jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY It may not be crystal clear what impact the position of the Court has on the former FRY Government's claim regarding continuity ; it is absolutely clear, however, that the hypothesis that the FRY was not a Member of the United Nations, and that it was not a Member State to the Statute or to the Genocide Convention, was not perceived and was not recognized as a fact by either the FRY or by the Court until and at the time when 11 July 1996 Judgment was rendered.
Continued Lack of Clarity and Continued Lack of Conclusive Facts regarding the Status of the FRY
17. Controversies and conflicting signals continued after the 11 July 1996 Judgment as well. To cite just one example, on 8 December 1999, three successor States of the SFRY (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia) joined by Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, submitted a draft resolution with the endeavour to clarify the ambiguous position of the FRY in the sense of denying the proposition of continuity. The submitted proposal explains that "the abbreviated name 'Yugoslavia' as used by the United Nations, refers only to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". According to this draft resolution, the General Assembly should declare that it Citation from paragraph 17 of the 11 July 1996 Judgment (I. C.J. Reports 1996, 595 at p. 610). unanimity and certainty regarding the FRY'S claim of continuity ("the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted"), and which resolution suggests that the FRY should apply for membership in the United Nations.
The course of action which the United Nations followed was that established by Article 4 of the United Nations Charter and by Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, provided for acceptance of new Members.
Following the procedure established by Article 4 of the United Nations Charter, the request of the FRY reached the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members, and this Committee recommended to the Security Council the ado tion of a resolution which would recommend the admission of YugoslaviaP*. Upon recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly decided on 1 November 2000 to admit the FRY to membership of the United Nations 37.
19. The decision of the General Assembly of 1 November 2000 îïnally dismissed the dilemmas and uncertainties, and put an end to the theory that the FRY may have been a Member of the United Nations before 1 November 2000 "continuing the State, international legal and political personality of the SFRY". A new fact took shape. The FRY became a new Member of the United Nations (clearly implying that it was not a Member earlier).
After the FRY was admitted as a new Member on 1 November 2000, the dilemmas have been resolved, and a period ended in which contradictory indications allowed different interpretations. It was not veiled anymore, but became an unequivocal fact that the FRY did not continue the personality of the SFRY, and was not a Member of the United Nations before "(1) An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence."
The requirements of admissibility of an application for revision are, thus, the following : (a) the application has to be based on a new fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, and (b) this has to be a fact which was unknown to both the Court and to the party claiming revision at the time when the judgment was given.
4'See the full text of the Note of the Secretary-General in Annex 29
C.1. New Fact "of such a nature to be a decisive factor"
23. The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new Member on 1 November 2000 is certainly a new fact. It can also be demonstrated, and the Applicant submits, that this new fact is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor regarding the question of jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY.
After the FRY was admitted as a new Member on 1 November 2000, dilemmas concerning its standing have been resolved, and it has become an unequivocal fact that the FRY did not continue the personality of the SFRY, was not a Member of the United Nations before 1 November 2000, was not a State party to the Statute, and was not a State party to the Genocide Convention. Since membership in the United Nations, combined with the status of a party to the Statute and to the Genocide Convention (including its Article IX), represent the only basis on which jurisdiction over the FRY was assumed, and could be assumed, the disappearance of this assumption and the proof of the disappearance of this assumption are clearly of such a nature to be a decisive factor regarding jurisdiction over the FRY -and require a revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996.
The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new Member clears ambiguities and sheds a different light on the issue of the membership of the FRY in the United Nations, in the Statute and in the Genocide Convention. Since the 11 July 1996 Judgment based jurisdiction on one ground (Article IX of the Genocide Convention), new facts which show that the FRY was not and could not have been bound by Article IX of this Convention, are decisive.
Applicant further submits that jurisdiction over the FRY could not have been asserted without United Nations membership and without the FRY being a State party to the Statute and to the Genocide Convention at the time of the I l July 1996 Judgment. The FRY asserts that no alternative basis existed or could have existed. Theoretically, there are two bases which could serve as a precondition for the jurisdiction of the Court to be extended to a nonMember of the United Nations or a non-party to the Statute. These are set in Article 93 (2) of the United Nations Charter and in Article 35 (2) of the Statute respectively. The Applicant shall demonstrate that under the circumstances of the case it is absolutely clear that neither of these two grounds could have justified jurisdiction over the FRY.
The FRY has not become a party to the Statute on ground of Article 93 ( 2 ) of the United Nations Charter
It is generally understood that the International Court of
Justice is open to the States which are parties to the Statute (Article 35 (1) of the Statute). Article 93 (1) of the United Nations Charter States that al1 Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute. Accordingly, States which are not Member States of the United Nations are not Member States to the Statute (or, at least not automatically). Article 93 (2) provides one possible way in which a non-Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute, and it also specifies the requisite conditions : "A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."
It is uncontested that the FRY never applied to become a party to the Statute under Article 93 (2) of the Charter, and it is also uncontested that the Security Council and the General Assembly never had such a claim or initiative on their agenda. Accordingly, it is obvious that the FRY did not become a Member State of the Statute under Article 93 (2) of the United Nations Charter and jurisdiction could not have been asserted over the FRY by reliance on Article 93 (2).
Jurisdiction over the FRY could not have been established on ground of
Article 35 ( 2 ) This provision is quite clear. Access is in principle possible to a State which is not a party to the Statute, but only on conditions laid down by the Security Council, and subject to special provisions contained in treaties in force.
The Security Council laid down appropriate conditions and procedures in its resolution of 15 October 1946 42. Section (1) of the resolution states :
"The International Court of Justice shall be open to a State which is not a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, upon the following condition, namely, that such State shall previously have deposited with the Registrar of the Court a declaration by which it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the terms and subject to the conditions of the Statute and Rules of the Court, and undertakes to comply in good faith with the decision or decisions of the Court and to accept al1 the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter." The resolution specifies further that such a declaration may be particular (accepting the jurisdiction in one particular case) or general ("accepting the jurisdiction generally in respect of al1 disputes or of a particular class of disputes which have already arisen or which may arise in the future"). It is also added that a State when making a declaration in pursuance of the Security Council resolution of 15 October 1946 and under Article 35 (2) of the Statute, may also in accordance with Article 36 of the Statute recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court.
It is perfectly clear that Article 35 (2) and the Security Council resolution of 15 October 1946 only provides for explicit declarations as a vehicle through which the jurisdiction of the Court may be extended to a non-party to the Statute. Moreover, the content of such declarations is predetermined, and so is their form (submission to the Registrar). This means that only such party behaviour, i.e. such party declarations which are identified by the Security Council as a suficient condition, may bring a party within the Court's scope of authority. Other party conduct -like bringing a claim, defending or not defending a claim, submitting a counterclaim, raising or not raising an objection -are without consequence and cannot yield jurisdiction over a party who is not a party to the Statute.
The FRY never deposited with the Registrar of the Court any declaration within the meaning of Article 35 (2) of the Statute and complying with the 15 October 1946 Security Council resolution. No declaration whatsoever (complying or non-complying with the Security Council resolution) concerning jurisdiction over the FRY was deposited before the Judgment of 11 July was rendered.
26. On 25 April 1999, the former Government of the FRY submitted a declaration regarding jurisdiction. The text of the Declaration reads :
"1 hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the said Court in al1 disputes arising or which may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to another vrocedure or another method of vacific settlement. The present ~eclaratiôn does not apply to disputes relating to auestions which, under international law, fall exclusivelv within the iurisdiction of the ~e d e r a l Republic of ~u~o s l a v i a , as well a i to territorial disputes.
The aforesaid obligation is accepted until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance. "whereas the Court therefore considers that proceedings may validly be instituted by a State against a State which is a party to such a special provision in a treaty in force, but is not a party to the Statute, and independently of the conditions laid down by the Security Council in its resolution 9 of 1946 . . .".
The Court found that the compromissory clause of Article IX of the Genocide Convention could be regarded prima facie as a relevant "special provision contained in a treaty in force". Taking as a~o s s i o e assumption that both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia could be parties to the Genocide Convention including its Article IX, the Court concluded that "[dlisputes to which Article IX applies are in any event prima facie within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court".
This interpretation of Article 35 (2) could conceivably allow jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY even without the FRY being a Member of the United Nations and a party to the Statute (assuming that the FRY could have become a Contracting Party of the Genocide Convention otherwise). One has to bear in mind, however, that the findings of the Court in its Order are prima faciefindings and they are indicated as such, thus they are reviewable and they are not conclusive. Furthermore, the wording is not unconditional. Moreover, the FRY respectfully submits the contention that : ( a ) this interpretation goes beyond the meaning of Article 35 (2), and ( b ) even if this interpretation were the correct one, it cannot result in jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY given the facts of the case.
29. The Applicant submits that a treaty provision cannot in itself provide for access to the Court to a non-Member of the Statute without such elementary conditions as those provided in Security Council resolution 9 of 1946. A party which is not a Member of the United Nations and is not a party to the Statute is not bound, for example, by Article 94 (1) of the United Nations Charter which obliges each Member of the United Nations to comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it is a party. It is exactly for these reasons that Security Council resolution 9 of 1946 specified the elements of a declaration which may result in jurisdiction over a non-party to the Statute 45. Furthermore, the principle of equality of the parties is one of the most pervasive principles underlying procedure before any court. In order to safeguard this principle between States which are parties to the Statute and States which are not, Article 35 (2) stresses that the conditions laid down by the Security Council shall in no case place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court. It is evident that inequality would emerge if some parties to proceedings before the Court would not be bound by conditions which parties to the Statute already accepted. The International Court of Justice was established by the United Nations Charter "as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Article 1 of the Statute). It can only adjudicate disputes involving States which are Member States of the United Nations, or States which have accepted conditions laid down by organs of the United Nations.
30. The reference to "special provisions of treaties in force" should be understood in the context of the drafting history of the Statute. A convincing explanation was provided by Sh. Rosenne. He recalls that Article 35 (2) of the Statute contains the same provision as the corresponding provision of the Permanent Court (with only one word changed in order to bring the English text in line with the F r e n~h )~~. Rosenne continues by observing that :
"The expression in paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Permanent Court subject to special provisions of treaties in force apparently was intended to refer to the Peace Treaties after the First World War. They contained several provisions giving the Permanent Court jurisdiction over disputes arising from them, and they were in force before that Statute was adopted. Article 35, paragraph 2, made it possible for litigation to take place with the former enemy Powers despite the fact that at the time the Protocol was adopted, they were not qualified to become parties to that instrument. Accordingly, 'in force' meant that the treaty had to be in force on the date of entry into force of the Statute of the Permanent Court (taken as 1 September 1921)." 47 He reiterates the same point later in the text by stressing :
"Since no change of substance was introduced in 1945, the words subject to the special provisions of treaties in force in the present Statute 45 In order to safeguard equality, the resolution makes it clear that that declaration of acceptance has to specify that it was made "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and with the terms and subject to the conditions of the Statute and Rules of the Court, and undertakes to comply in good faith with the decision or decisions of the Court and to accept al1 the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter".
should be interpreted as meaning treaties that were in force on the date when the Statute entered into force, that is 24 October 1945." 48
That the phrase "treaties in force" was intended to have a limited meaning was also confirmed by Judges Anzilotti and Huber 49. During the discussion on the Revision of the Rules of the Permanent Court (Eleventh Session, TwentySecond Meeting), the record States that Anzilotti stressed :
"[tlhe peace treaties in certain cases imposed the Court's jurisdiction on the central States ; in other cases these States had been given the right of themselves instituting proceedings before the Court. That being so, to allow the Council to impose other conditions would amount to modifying the peace treaties, which could not be done. The clause in question had in mind the peace treaties." Anzilotti added that "[tlhere is a reason which made it impossible to read the clause as covering everything except special agreements: for it would be difîïcult to understand why a privileged position should be accorded, for instance to Turkey and Russia, supposing that, tomorrow, they were to come before the Court under a treaty concluded between them" 50.
President Huber agreed with Anzilotti and stated that "[tlhe exception stated in Article 35 could only be intended to cover situations provided for by the treaties of peace" 51.
31. Even if one were to adopt, for argument's sake, a broader interpretation of Article 35 (2), and even if jurisdiction could be assumed over a non-party to the Statute on ground of Article IX of the Genocide Convention only, this could not justify jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY.
After 1 November 2000 it became clear that the FRY did not continue the SFRY's membership in the United Nations, and did not become party to the treaties which were ratified by the SFRY. Accordingly, the FRY did not continue the membership of the SFRY in the Genocide Convention either. Moreover, according to Article XI of the Genocide Convention, the FRY could not have become a party to the Genocide Convention without being a Member of the United Nations, or without having received a special invitation of the General Assembly. The prohibition of genocide may very well be a principle which must not be disregarded by anyone, but this does not necessarily mean that the specific provisions of the Convention are automatically binding, and it certainly does not mean that the procedural stipulations of the Genocide Convention (like that of Article IX) are binding without specific acceptance.
The FRY expressed its intention to become a party to the Genocide Convention only in its Notification of Accession on ground of Article XI (3) of the Convention (which provides for new accessions). This did not happen before the 11 July 1996 Judgment was rendered ; this happened on 8 "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not consider itself bound by Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and, therefore, before any dispute to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a party may validly be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this Article, the specific and explicit consent of the FRY is required in each case."
It clearly follows that even if one were to adopt an extensive interpretation of Article 35 (2) of the Statute including treaties which came to force after the adoption of the Statute, and even if Article IX of the Genocide Convention could be considered as one of such "special provisions contained in treaties in force", the jurisdiction of the Court could not be based on this "specialprovision" because it was never accepted by the FRY.
It follows that :
32. The fact that the FRY gained admission to the United Nations on 1 November 2000 as a new Member (instead of continuing the membership of the SFRY since April 1992) put the issue of jurisdiction ratione personae over Yugoslavia in an entirely different perspective and context. The assumption of the continued membership in the United Nations and continued status as party to the Genocide Convention, which came to expression in the Declaration of the former Government of the FRY, was critical, because there was no other assumption which could justify jurisdiction over the FRY ratione personae.
The new facts have brought conclusive clarification to the effect that : The Applicant believes that this is quite sufficient to confirm that this condition to the admissibility of the request for revision ("unknown to the Court and to the party claiming revision") was satisfied.
In our case, this new fact becomes relevant in the following way. There was a genuine dilemma as to whether the FRY did or did not continue the membership of the SFRY in the United Nations and the status of the SFRY as party to the Statute and to the Genocide Convention. This dilemma was resolved by the new fact of admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new State, and by accession of the FRY to the Genocide Convention, again as a new State. The new fact -clearly unknown earlier -has become decisive because it confirmed a different resolution of the dilemma -not the one which served as an assumption in the Judgment.
34. For the sake of argument, the Applicant wants to demonstrate that the dilemma was a legitimate one, the position taken by the FRY regarding continuity with the SFRY was not a frivolous one, or one based on negligence. The FRY was consistent in asserting this position which was corroborated by some facts and circumstances, while it was challenged by some other facts and circumstances. Al1 facts and circumstances relating to the issue of continuity were a matter of public record, equally accessible to the Court and to the parties. There are no facts or circumstances which the FRY would have, or could have, withheld, since the issue was that of the international recognition of the FRY'S claim on continuity with the SFRY. The essence of the matter is that, before the status of the FRY was finally clarified, these facts and circumstances did allow different conclusions, and the possible solutions were -in the words of the Court -"not free from legal difficulties" 53.
35.
The concept of continuity advanced by the former Government of the FRY proved to be wrong, but it was not implausible and it was not the product of some manipulation. To the contrary, since the FRY arduously contested the jurisdiction of the Court, it would have been in its interest to show that the FRY did not continue the membership of the SFRY in the United Nations and did not continue automatically to be a party to the Statute and to the Genocide Convention.
